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Abstract
Our paper investigates the link between outsourcing and wages utilising a large household
panel and combining it with industry level information on industries’ outsourcing activities
from input-output tables. By doing so we can arguably overcome the potential endogeneity
bias as well as other shortcomings that aﬀect industry level studies. We ﬁnd that frag-
mentation has had a marked impact on wages. Distinguishing three skill categories we ﬁnd
evidence that outsourcing reduced the real wage for workers in the lowest skill categories;
this result is robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and deﬁnitions of outsourcing.
Furthermore we ﬁnd some evidence that high-skilled workers experienced increased wages
due to fragmentation.
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1I Introduction
Outsourcing is a growing phenomenon in world trade and has sparked a lot of interest in
the recent academic literature and business press. As for the car industry, the Economist
(23 February 2002, p. 99) writes that: ”The whole industry is disintegrating (or becoming
less vertical) as vehicle assemblers try to outsource more and more of what they once did for
themselves.” There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that this is not limited to the car industry
but is also observed in other manufacturing and services sectors.1
Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) provide evidence for the worldwide importance of out-
sourcing from data collected for 10 OECD and four emerging market countries. They ﬁnd
that trade in outsourced components in the vertical production chain accounts for around 21
percent of these countries’ exports. Moreover, international outsourcing grew very strongly
by approximately 30 percent between 1970 and 1990.2
Given that the increase in international outsourcing coincided with deteriorating relative
wages and employment chances for low skilled workers in many developed countries much re-
search has been devoted to assess the impact of this disintegration of production on domestic
labour markets (see Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999 and Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001)
for the US, Hijzen, G¨ org and Hine (2002) and Hijzen (2003) for the UK and Geishecker
(2002) for Germany).3 Most studies that investigate the impact of international outsourcing
do so by estimating the relative demand for skilled labour derived from a cost function, or
mandated wage regressions using aggregate industry or country level data. In a sense this
is quite unsatisfactory, as outsourcing has implications for micro units (ﬁrms or workers)
which should arguably be studied using micro level data. Also, as we discuss in more detail
below, there are potential endogeneity problems when regressing industry relative wages on
industry level outsourcing activity. A notable exception in this literature is the recent work
on Japanese micro level data by Head and Ries (2002) which examines the impact of out-
sourcing on relative labour demand. They ﬁnd that expansion of employment in aﬃliates
in low income countries (which can be taken as a proxy of international outsourcing of low
1For example, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) provide examples from IT, car manufacturing, sport shoe manu-
facturing etc.
2See also Feenstra (1998) for a discussion of the growth of outsourcing or fragmentation of production. We
will use these two terms synonymously in this paper.
3There have also been studies for other countries. See Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a concise review of this
literature. The papers on labour market eﬀects of outsourcing are of course related to the wider debate on the
eﬀects of trade and technology on wages, see Leamer (1998), Freeman (1995), Krugman (1995), Berman, Bound
and Machin (1998)
2skill production) raises the skill intensity of domestic production.
Our paper investigates the link between outsourcing and wages from a diﬀerent perspec-
tive utilising a large household panel and combining it with industry level information on
industries’ outsourcing activities from input-output tables. Hence, we directly assess the
eﬀects of international outsourcing on wages at the level of the individual. By doing so we
can arguably overcome the potential endogeneity bias as well as other shortcomings that
may aﬀect industry level studies.
Our empirical analysis uses data from the large German Socio-Economic Household Panel,
which is described in some detail below, combined with industry level data for the period
1991 to 2000.4 Germany is an interesting case to analyse, as there is a general consensus
that relative wages of high vs. low skilled workers have remained virtually unchanged since
the 1980s, even though fragmentation of activities has increased substantially during the
1990s, probably aided by the opening up of low wage Eastern and Central European markets
which provided potential for fragmentation.5 Against this background of nearly constant
relative wages on aggregate, we ﬁnd from our individual level data that fragmentation has,
nevertheless, had a marked impact on wages. Distinguishing three skill categories we ﬁnd
evidence that outsourcing reduced the real wage for workers in the lowest skill categories;
this result is robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and deﬁnitions of fragmentation.
Furthermore we ﬁnd some evidence that high-skilled workers experienced increased wages
due to fragmentation and trade.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews brieﬂy the theo-
retical and empirical literature on fragmentation and labour markets. Section III highlights
recent labour market trends and motivates our empirical study. Section IV introduces the
empirical model and discusses the data set. Section VI presents the empirical ﬁndings and
section VII concludes.
II Fragmentation and wages
The causes and consequences of fragmentation of production have attracted considerable
interest in the theoretical literature. While papers like Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and
Kohler (2003) stress the importance of international diﬀerences in relative prices as driving
4See Hunt (2001), Burda and Mertens (2001) and Krueger and Pischke (1995) for analyses using this data set
in diﬀerent contexts.
5See the recent series of articles in the German business paper Handelsblatt under the heading ”Globalisierung,
neuester Stand” in the issue of 2 September 2003.
3force of fragmentation, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001) and Harris (2001), for example, focus
on the role of exogenous reductions in general services and telecommunications costs for
allowing outsourcing to occur. The consequences of fragmentation for local labour markets
are not clear cut in theory, depending on the models and assumptions chosen, outsourcing
of the low skill intensive part of production can lead to decreases or increases in the wage
of (unskilled) labour in the fragmenting economy (see, for example: Feenstra and Hanson
(1996), Arndt (1997), Arndt (1999), Venables (1999); Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Kohler
(2004)). Whether workers in practice gain or lose from fragmentation is, therefore, largely
an empirical question.
One of the ﬁrst systematic empirical studies on the labour market impact of international
fragmentation is Feenstra and Hanson (1996). In their study for the United States they
estimate a factor share equation for an industry panel of more than 400 industries. In
the model international outsourcing, approximated by the industries’ import penetration
ratios, is implemented as a shift parameter similar to technological progress. Following this
procedure, the authors report that approximately 15% to 33% of the increase of the cost
share of non-production labour over the period 1979-1987 can be explained by international
outsourcing. In a follow-up study Feenstra and Hanson (1999) apply a narrower deﬁnition of
international outsourcing by focusing on imported intermediate inputs of an industry from
the same industry abroad. According to this study international outsourcing can explain
between 11% and 15% of the observed decline in the cost share of production labour in U.S.
manufacturing between 1979 and 1990. Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001) extend the above
studies by simultaneously incorporating several trade and technology related measures that
can shift relative labour demand in a system of factor demand equations. Their results
suggest that international outsourcing as well as trade and technological change signiﬁcantly
lowered relative demand for low-skilled labour.
The above studies have in common that international outsourcing is assumed to be ex-
ogenous to the industry, hence international outsourcing is no ”choice factor” (Morrison-Paul
and Siegel (2001) p. 245). This assumption could in principle be criticised since, at least to
some degree, international fragmentation is an industry’s choice variable, and relative labour
demand and the extent of fragmentation are then determined simultaneously.
Falk and Koebel (2002) propose an approach that in principle overcomes endogeneity
bias in industry level studies. Using a Box-Cox cost function, which nests the normalised
quadratic as well as the translog functional form, they estimate elasticities of substitution
from a system of input-output equations. Fragmentation is implemented in the model as
a ﬂexible choice variable captured by relative prices for imported intermediate goods and
4purchased services. Their ﬁndings suggest that between 1978 and 1990 neither imported
material inputs nor purchased services substitute for unskilled labour in German manufac-
turing industries.6
This approach can be criticised from a theoretical point since the impact of interna-
tional fragmentation is only captured by relative price changes for imported intermediate
inputs. However, intensiﬁed international fragmentation is consistent with unchanging or
even increasing relative prices for imported intermediate inputs. The driving forces behind
fragmentation are not necessarily the dynamics of relative price changes but exogenous fac-
tors such as trade liberalisation, the opening up of former communist states or new advances
in communication technologies that enable ﬁrms or industries to economise on absolute cost
diﬀerentials between domestic and foreign production at a ﬁxed point in time (see Wood
(2002), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), Harris (2001)). Following the theory, international
fragmentation should be understood as a fundamental exogenous shift in the production
technology which aﬀects relative demand for heterogenous labour over and above relative
price changes between domestic and foreign input factors.
Our approach signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the previous empirical studies and may be con-
sidered suitable to overcome the shortcomings discussed above. Utilising a large household
panel, we will incorporate the industry’s international fragmentation activity as a shift pa-
rameter in a Mincerian (Mincer (1974)) wage model. Since the industry’s fragmentation
activities can be considered exogenous to the individual, endogeneity bias due to simulta-
neous determination of labour demand and international fragmentation undertaken at the
industry or plant can be overcome without solely focusing on relative input prices.
Furthermore this approach has substantial advantages over the industry level analysis,
as it allows controlling for individual observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In addition,
changes in relative earnings can now be decomposed into wage gains and losses for diﬀerent
skill groups.
Given the nature of our econometric estimation our results should be interpreted as the
short run eﬀects of international fragmentation on wages of individuals within industries.
Hence, we can think of our approach as essentially partial equilibrium, in line with the
theoretical one sector setting of, e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (1996). This is consistent with
a short run view of the economy such that labour is immobile between industries. Many
previous empirical studies implicitly or explicitly make the same assumption (Feenstra and
6Another solution to this problem could be to instrument for international fragmentation, given that one can
ﬁnd valid instruments for international fragmentation (see Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001) and Hsieh and Woo
(2003) for applications).
5Hanson (1996), Morrison-Paul and Siegel (2001), Hsieh and Woo (2003)).
The literature analysing the labour market impact of international trade in a household
panel framework is sparse and studies more speciﬁcally assessing the impact of international
fragmentation on the earnings distribution in the context of individual wage models are, to
the best of our knowledge, not existing. 7
In line with Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (1999) we construct













with j denoting the respective two-digit manufacturing industry (j ² J), IMP the value
of imported intermediate inputs from a foreign industry and Y the industry’s output value.
Hence, narrowly deﬁned fragmentation only captures an industry’s imported intermediate
inputs from the same industry abroad while widely deﬁned fragmentation incorporates all
imported intermediate manufacturing goods of an industry.
III Recent labour market trends and fragmentation
It is well established that relative earnings of low skilled workers have decreased in most
OECD countries during the last two decades. However, wage trends are far from uniform
across countries with the US and Great Britain experiencing very strong increases in the
wage dispersion, and countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan and Spain only experiencing
modest decreases in the relative earnings of low skilled workers (see Freeman and Katz (1995),
OECD (1994) for a detailed discussion).
In this study we focus on the German labour market which is an interesting case since
it is not only the largest economy in Europe, but it is also far more open to international
trade than for instance the U.S. and has a fairly rigid labour market. Furthermore political
and economic transition in the former communist Central and Eastern European countries
7Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999) estimate the impact of trade on real wages for diﬀerent skill groups
and various measures of labour market mobility combining data from the German Socio-Economic Household
Panel and industry level data for the period 1985-1991. Their results of a random eﬀects model indicate that
an increase in the trade deﬁcit ratio lowers real wages for low-skilled as well as for high-skilled workers by a
comparable amount. Hence, there is no indication of a skill bias in the wage impact of international trade.
6(CEEC’s) during the 1990’s now allows for intensive production sharing with these economies
at Germany’s doorstep with potentially large implications for the German labour market.
Nonetheless, considering the wage distribution in Germany, abundant empirical evidence
suggests that relative wages of the low skilled have virtually not changed or have even
increased since the 1980’s (see Abraham and Houseman (1995), Fitzenberger (1999), Prasad
(2000), Beaudry and Green (2000)).8 Nonetheless, real net wages have fallen substantially
in absolute terms over the 1990’s.
Against this background international fragmentation in German manufacturing has grown
substantially. Figure 1 shows the development of international fragmentation during the
1990’s for the manufacturing industry as a whole. As can be seen, narrowly deﬁned inter-
national fragmentation (as in equation 1) increased by around 60 percent between 1991 and
2000 while widely deﬁned fragmentation grew somewhat slower by 45 percent over the same
period. Figure 2 shows the evolvement of international fragmentation by two digit NACE
industries. Even though international fragmentation is of very diﬀerent importance for the
separate industries and the dynamic patterns vary considerably almost every industry shows
signiﬁcant growth in the fragmentation activity.
Thus, constant relative earnings for low-skilled workers coincide with pronounced in-
creases in international fragmentation which at ﬁrst sight casts doubt on a connection be-
tween relative earnings and fragmentation. However, relative earnings can be determined
by a whole range of demand and supply factors that might cancel each other out. A thor-
ough analysis of the impact of international fragmentation on the wage distribution therefore
requires simultaneous controlling for other important determinants of the wage structure.
IV The Empirical Model
In order to analyse more rigorously the impact of international outsourcing on wages we
estimate variants of the following log wage equation:
ln WAGEijt = ® + ¯ DEMOGit + ° WORKit + ± EDUCit (3)
+ µ INDjt + ¸ FRAGjt + ¿j + ¹t + ºjt + ¶i + ²it
where WAGEijt denotes individual i’s monthly wages in industry j. We apply control
variables that are standard in such wage regressions, see for example Mincer (1974), Brown
8Our own analysis on the basis of the German Socio-Economic Panel for the years 1991-2000 also fails to
identify signiﬁcant changes in the earnings distribution between diﬀerent skill groups, which is in line with the
literature.
7and Medoﬀ (1989), Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991). DEMOG denotes the demographic
control variables age, age square, marital status, geographic region. The second set of control
variables (WORK) contains characteristics related to the workplace such as size and own-
ership of the ﬁrm, tenure, tenure square, occupational category and the log of actual hours
worked per week.9 A third set of control variables (EDUC) contains educational dummies
for high education (edhigh) and medium (edmed) education, low education (edlow) is the
omitted category. We also control for time changing industry characteristics by including
industry output (IND). We subsequently incorporate a narrow and a wide deﬁnition of
international fragmentation (FRAG) as in equation 1 and 2. The error term is decomposed
into general industry speciﬁc eﬀects (¿j), general time speciﬁc eﬀects (¹t) and industry spe-
ciﬁc time eﬀects (ºjt) which we estimate with a full set of industry dummies, time dummies
and industry speciﬁc time dummies respectively. This also enables us to extensively control
for time invariant and time varying industry level wage determinants other than captured
by our fragmentation (FRAG) and output variable (IND). Furthermore the general time
dummies and industry speciﬁc time dummies also capture supply side eﬀects. We also allow
for individual ﬁxed eﬀects (¶i) that take account of unchanging observable and unobserv-
able individual characteristics.10 The remaining error term (²it) is assumed to be normally
distributed.
Combining individual and industry level data could give rise to contemporaneous cor-
relation that results in distorted standard errors as discussed in Moulton (1990). We are
however conﬁdent that controlling for industry ﬁxed (¿j) and time speciﬁc eﬀects (ºjt) takes
away this distortion.
One further potential problem casting doubt on the validity of our results could arise from
sample selection as low-skilled workers are more likely to lose their jobs.11 However sample
selection bias only occurs if selection is correlated with the idiosyncratic error term. This is
unlikely in our case, since we control for a wide range of observable as well as unobservable
characteristics. Nevertheless we test for that hypothesis implementing the simple procedure
suggested by Wooldridge (2002) in Chapter 17.7.1. This test allows us to reject correlation
between selection and the idiosyncratic error term.
Equation (3) constrains all coeﬃcients to the be same across skill groups. In order to relax
9We therefore allow for a stochastic relationship between working hours and pay to account for possible
measurement error.
10Random eﬀects were rejected in a Hausman speciﬁcation test.
11A fact that is fairly well established in the literature (see Reinberg and Hummel (2002)) and that we can also
conﬁrm with our data.
8these restrictions we also estimate the equation for each and every skill group separately.
V Data
The analysis is based on data from Sample A and E 12 from the German Socio Economic
Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1991 to 2000 (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) for a
detailed description of the panel).
Our sample is restricted to prime age (18 to 65 years) males working full time (more
than 30 hours a week) in the manufacturing industry (NACE 15-36). Observations with
missing wage information were excluded from the sample. In order to maximize the number
of observations, we choose an unbalanced design of the sample. The sample therefore covers
2329 individuals yielding a total number of 7306 observations. In order to avoid selection bias
with respect to item non-response that might be not completely random each explanatory
variable was supplemented with a dummy for missing values. Subsequently missing values
where recoded to zero and the generated dummies for missing values also act as regressors in
the model.13 Wages are monthly labour earnings preceding the respective interview month
supplemented by the monthly share of additional payments such as 13th and 14th month
pay, Christmas and holiday bonus and proﬁt sharing payments.
We apply three diﬀerent skill deﬁnitions that only partly overlap. A description of the
alternative skill groupings can be found in Table 1. Firstly, we diﬀerentiate between three
diﬀerent skill groups based on information on educational attainment and vocational train-
ing. Secondly, we utilise internationally comparable information following the International
Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED)14 to derive a somewhat diﬀerent skill diﬀeren-
tiation. Thirdly, we apply an alternative skill grouping based on the respondents information
on the qualiﬁcation that their current job actually requires. Applying this alternative skill
grouping is an interesting extension since it takes account of the actually demanded qualiﬁ-
cation by employers as opposed to the supplied qualiﬁcation by employees.
Table 2 shows the skill structure, based on educational attainment, within each manu-
facturing industry and the employment share of the respective industry.
Industry level data on international fragmentation were obtained from input-output ta-
bles by the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce. Intermediate inputs corresponding to narrowly
deﬁned international fragmentation are represented by the main diagonal of the input-output
12Respondents from the foreigner, the immigrant and the East-German sample are therefore excluded.
13In general these coeﬃcients are only reported if statistically signiﬁcant
14see UNESCO (1997)
9matrix for imports. Intermediate inputs corresponding to the wide deﬁnition are represented
by the column sum of imported intermediate inputs from manufacturing industries. Mea-
sures of trade competition are based on the OECD commodity trade database. SITC 5
digit trade data was aggregated to NACE 2 digit industries according to the concordance
provided by EUROSTAT (http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/ramon/). Data on industry
output were obtained from the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
VI Results
The results of estimating equations (3) and (4) using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator to allow for
time invariant individual speciﬁc eﬀects and applying the ﬁrst skill deﬁnition15 are reported
in Table 3. The regressions also include a full set of regional dummies16 and time dummies
as well as a full set of time ﬁxed and time varying industry dummies. Note that the coef-
ﬁcients on the individual and ﬁrm level variables are largely as expected: Age and tenure
are positively related with wages (in a non-linear fashion for the former variable) and wages
also increase for married workers and with the educational attainment. We also ﬁnd that
workers in small ﬁrms on average receive lower wages than in large (size > 2000 employees
is default category) ﬁrms, reﬂecting the common ﬁnding of a ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect (Brown
and Medoﬀ (1989)).
The variable of most interest to us is, of course, the measure of international fragmenta-
tion. Column (a) reports results for the narrow measure of outsourcing as deﬁned in equation
(1), while column (b) is for the wide measure as in equation (2). As can be seen, in these
regressions we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀects of international outsourcing on
wages. A one percentage point increase in the narrow fragmentation intensity leads to an
overall reduction in wages by 4 percent and a one percentage point increase in the wide
fragmentation intensity reduces overall wages by 3 percent.
We now estimate the model for each and every skill group17 separately thereby allowing
for diﬀerences in the wage determination for diﬀerent skill groups. Again we incorporate
a full set of regional dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and industry dummies
interacted with time. Table 4 depicts the estimation results with narrowly and widely deﬁned
fragmentation for each skill group. Most notably, the coeﬃcients on the individual and
15see Table 1
16The regional dummies are deﬁned for each of the old West German federal states (L¨ ander) plus one dummy
capturing all new East German states.
17applying the ﬁrst skill deﬁnition as in Table 1
10ﬁrm level variables diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the estimations for the diﬀerent skill groups.
Constraining the coeﬃcients to be uniform across skill groups therefore indeed seems not
appropriate.18
With regard to the impact of fragmentation the coeﬃcients also diﬀer substantially from
the previous speciﬁcation (compare Table 3 and Table 4). For high-skilled workers the
coeﬃcient of narrowly deﬁned outsourcing is now found to be statistically signiﬁcant and
positive with a one percentage point increase in the outsourcing intensity ceteris paribus
yielding a positive wage premium of 3 percent. However, widely deﬁned outsourcing is found
to have no signiﬁcant impact on the wage for high-skilled workers (see Table 4 columns a and
d). For medium-skilled workers the estimated coeﬃcient of narrowly measured fragmentation
is now statistically insigniﬁcant. Contrasting this result the estimation with the wide measure
of international outsourcing yields a negative signiﬁcant coeﬃcient with a one percentage
point increase in the wide outsourcing intensity resulting in a 3 percent wage fall for medium-
skilled workers (see Table 4 column e). Only for low-skilled workers both the narrow as well
as the wide measure of fragmentation are found to have a signiﬁcant negative impact on
wages. A one percentage point increase in the narrow outsourcing intensity ceteris paribus
decreases low-skilled workers’ wages by 7 percent while a one percentage point increase in
the wide fragmentation intensity ceteris paribus decreases wages by 13 percent.
As mentioned above, an earlier study by Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999) anal-
ysed the eﬀect of trade on individuals’ wages using data from the GSOEP for the 1985 -
1991 period. As a further test of the robustness of our results to the fragmentation measure
used, we calculate a sectors’ degree of import penetration as imports over gross production
in industry j (similar to Haisken-DeNew and Zimmermann (1999)). In particular the latter
measure can arguably be considered as measuring the outsourcing of low-skill intensive pro-
duction to low-wage locations (Anderton and Brenton (1999)). The results of the regressions
with Non-OECD import penetration ratios are reported in columns g-i in Table 4. As can
be seen, low skilled workers lose from increased import penetration, while there is no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant evidence that high skilled workers beneﬁt in terms of receiving higher
wages.
In additional model speciﬁcations we apply the two alternative skill measures based on
ISCED classiﬁcations and required qualiﬁcations for the respondents current job (see section
V and Table 1) and estimate the impact of narrow and wide fragmentation as well as import
penetration for each skill groups of the alternative skill measures.
Applying the skill grouping in line with the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Edu-
18This is also conﬁrmed more formally by an F-test that rejects the parameter constraints.
11cation (ISCED)19 we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant impact of narrow and wide outsourcing
as well as import penetration on wages for high skilled workers. For medium- and low-skilled
workers, however, a one percentage point increase in narrow fragmentation intensity ceteris
paribus lowers wages by 4 respectively 5 percent while neither wide fragmentation nor import
penetration are found to be statistically signiﬁcant (see Table 5).
The results for the skill deﬁnition based on required education20 indicate that narrow
fragmentation has a signiﬁcant positive impact on workers who report that their job requires
a college or technical school training with a one percentage point increase in the narrow
outsourcing intensity ceteris paribus raising wages by 2 percent. For workers with lower
required qualiﬁcations we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of narrow outsourcing
with a one percentage point increase ceteris paribus yielding a wage loss of 3 percent. With
respect to wide fragmentation and import penetration our estimates suggest no signiﬁcant
wage eﬀects (see Table 6).
In order to get a better idea of the economic signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients we perform
simulations based on the statistically signiﬁcant results in Table 3 to 6. For the simulations
we ﬁrstly use the estimation results in the tables to predict the expected wage for our sample.
We then use the same regression results and data to obtain a prediction in which we constrain
the outsourcing variable to the value of 1991. Hence, this prediction can be interpreted as
showing the hypothetical average wage for the sample with constant outsourcing.
The comparisons of the standard prediction and the prediction without outsourcing are
plotted in Figures 3 to 11 for the three measures of fragmentation and the various skill
deﬁnitions.21 In Figure 3, for example, the plots illustrate that in our sample of prime
age, full time working men monthly wages for the average low-skilled manufacturing worker
would have been approximately 300 DM higher in 1999 if there had been no increase in
fragmentation since 1991. For high skilled workers, the wage gain following fragmentation was
about 400 DM in the same year (see Figure 5). The predicted eﬀects are in the same direction
in all diagrams, it is notable, however, that the magnitude of the wage change related to
fragmentation depends on the actual variable used to calculate the level of fragmentation.
19see Table 1
20see Table 1
21We only show predictions of the point estimates if statistically signiﬁcant. Of course, we could also construct
conﬁdence intervals for the predictions but for the sake of clarity of the diagrams we refrain from plotting these.
12VII Conclusion
This paper adds to the literature on the implications of outsourcing for labour markets by
investigating the eﬀect of the fragmentation of production on wages for diﬀerent skill groups.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to use individual level data to look at
this issue. Our results show that fragmentation has a marked impact on wages. We ﬁnd
strong evidence of a negative eﬀect of fragmentation on the real wage for low-skilled workers.
This result is robust to a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations and deﬁnitions of outsourcing.
We also ﬁnd some evidence that high-skilled workers gain from fragmentation in terms of
receiving higher wages.
This suggests that low-skilled workers are the losers from this form of globalisation of
production, while high-skilled workers are, on average, the group who may be able to gain.
This has implications for policy makers, who need to debate whether losers should be com-
pensated or in any other way be the focus of policies aimed at easing the adjustment cost of
globalisation
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Table 1: Alternative skill classiﬁcations
1) Educational Attainment
low skill no degree
no degree + vocational training
lower school degree
medium skill lower school degree + additional vocational training
intermediary school
intermediary school + additional vocational training
degree for professional college
degree of professional college + additional vocational training
high school degree
high skill high school + additional vocational training
higher technical college
University degree
2) International Standard Classiﬁcation of Education (ISCED)
low skill Lower secondary education, Second stage of basic education
medium skill Upper secondary education, Post-secondary non tertiary education, ﬁrst stage of tertiary education
high skill Second stage of tertiary education
3) Required Qualiﬁcation
low skill work requires less than technical college or university degree
high skill work requires technical college or university degree
Table 2: Employment shares and skill* structure of industries in %
Employment Share High-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled
of industry within industry
Food products and beverages 6.12 13.64 75.67 10.68
Tobacco 0.13 0.00 100.00 0.00
Textiles 1.74 1.76 94.48 3.77
Wearing apparel 0.34 5.00 95.00 0.00
Tanning,dressing of leather 0.56 0.00 85.33 14.67
Wood products, except furniture 1.93 6.60 73.93 19.47
Pulp, paper and paper products 1.51 5.77 74.81 19.42
Publishing, printing and reproduction 3.16 27.06 68.89 4.04
Coke, reﬁned petroleum 0.58 17.78 82.22 0.00
Chemicals and chemical products 12.87 20.83 68.03 11.14
Rubber and plastic products 2.56 10.38 71.15 18.47
Other non-metallic mineral products 3.00 1.95 89.91 8.14
Basic metals 3.46 8.81 76.51 14.67
Fabricated metal products 20.44 9.59 77.61 12.80
Machinery and equipment 11.81 20.32 71.32 8.36
Oﬃce machinery and computer 0.30 22.50 77.50 0.00
Electrical machinery and apparatus 8.71 26.36 68.24 5.40
Radio, television and communication 1.89 31.78 65.49 2.73
Medical, precision and optical instruments 3.08 21.97 75.85 2.18
Motor vehicles, trailers 12.53 18.53 73.53 7.93
Other transport equipment 1.54 16.50 80.49 3.00
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 1.97 16.43 70.95 12.62
*applying the ﬁrst skill deﬁnition from Table 1
23Table 3: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression for Fragmentation








Number of Children 0.0095 0.0095
[1.62] [1.62]
Firm size: < 20 -0.1060 -0.1060
[5.89]*** [5.89]***
Firm size: < 200 -0.0428 -0.0428
[2.93]*** [2.93]***
Firm size: < 2000 -0.0064 -0.0064
[0.58] [0.58]
Firm:Public Owner -0.0356 -0.0356
[0.92] [0.92]


















High educated 0.4123 0.4123
[10.95]*** [10.95]***









Number of individuals 2329 2329
R2 0.27 0.27
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and interaction terms of industry and
year; default categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; High Education; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012
24Table 4: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression for Fragmentation by Educational Attainment
Narrow Fragmentation Wide Fragmentation Import Penetration Non-OECD
High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Age 0.1401 0.1289 0.1200 0.1531 0.1172 0.2775 0.1630 0.1289 0.0515
[4.05]*** [5.67]*** [3.69]*** [4.32]*** [5.71]*** [5.79]*** [4.86]*** [5.52]*** [1.31]
Age2 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0007
[5.67]*** [16.28]*** [2.58]** [5.67]*** [16.28]*** [2.58]** [5.67]*** [16.28]*** [2.58]**
Married 0.1006 0.0535 -0.0718 0.1006 0.0535 -0.0718 0.1006 0.0535 -0.0718
[3.27]*** [3.74]*** [1.30] [3.27]*** [3.74]*** [1.30] [3.27]*** [3.74]*** [1.30]
Number of Children 0.0430 0.0123 -0.0316 0.0430 0.0123 -0.0316 0.0430 0.0123 -0.0316
[3.39]*** [1.85]* [1.29] [3.39]*** [1.85]* [1.29] [3.39]*** [1.85]* [1.29]
Firm size: < 20 -0.2194 -0.0530 -0.1231 -0.2194 -0.0530 -0.1231 -0.2194 -0.0530 -0.1231
[4.16]*** [2.64]*** [1.65] [4.16]*** [2.64]*** [1.65] [4.16]*** [2.64]*** [1.65]
Firm size: < 200 -0.0193 -0.0128 -0.0579 -0.0193 -0.0128 -0.0579 -0.0193 -0.0128 -0.0579
[0.59] [0.78] [0.88] [0.59] [0.78] [0.88] [0.59] [0.78] [0.88]
Firm size: < 2000 -0.0304 0.0077 0.0188 -0.0304 0.0077 0.0188 -0.0304 0.0077 0.0188
[1.16] [0.63] [0.37] [1.16] [0.63] [0.37] [1.16] [0.63] [0.37]
Firm:Public Owner -0.1606 -0.0095 -0.1391 -0.1606 -0.0095 -0.1391 -0.1606 -0.0095 -0.1391
[2.02]** [0.21] [0.92] [2.02]** [0.21] [0.92] [2.02]** [0.21] [0.92]
ln(Actual work hours) 0.2086 0.3251 0.3296 0.2086 0.3251 0.3296 0.2086 0.3251 0.3296
[3.01]*** [9.72]*** [2.56]** [3.01]*** [9.72]*** [2.56]** [3.01]*** [9.72]*** [2.56]**
Tenure -0.0035 0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0035 0.0025 -0.0030 -0.0035 0.0025 -0.0030
[1.27] [2.66]*** [0.70] [1.27] [2.66]*** [0.70] [1.27] [2.66]*** [0.70]
Tenure not known -0.5080 -0.2561 -0.1021 -0.5080 -0.2561 -0.1021 -0.5080 -0.2561 -0.1021
[3.39]*** [1.97]** [0.58] [3.39]*** [1.97]** [0.58] [3.39]*** [1.97]** [0.58]
Occ:Managers/Legisl. 0.2705 0.0893 0.3602 0.2705 0.0893 0.3602 0.2705 0.0893 0.3602
[2.09]** [2.92]*** [1.58] [2.09]** [2.92]*** [1.58] [2.09]** [2.92]*** [1.58]
Occ:Scientists 0.2552 -0.0096 0.3760 0.2552 -0.0096 0.3760 0.2552 -0.0096 0.3760
[1.99]** [0.28] [1.82]* [1.99]** [0.28] [1.82]* [1.99]** [0.28] [1.82]*
Occ:Technicians 0.2272 -0.0086 0.0290 0.2272 -0.0086 0.0290 0.2272 -0.0086 0.0290
[1.75]* [0.31] [0.15] [1.75]* [0.31] [0.15] [1.75]* [0.31] [0.15]
Occ:Clerks 0.2229 -0.0269 0.1967 0.2229 -0.0269 0.1967 0.2229 -0.0269 0.1967
[1.65]* [0.90] [1.56] [1.65]* [0.90] [1.56] [1.65]* [0.90] [1.56]
Occ:Craft 0.2436 0.0088 0.0789 0.2436 0.0088 0.0789 0.2436 0.0088 0.0789
[1.92]* [0.34] [1.22] [1.92]* [0.34] [1.22] [1.92]* [0.34] [1.22]
Occ:Operators/Assembl. 0.2142 0.0438 0.0482 0.2142 0.0438 0.0482 0.2142 0.0438 0.0482
[1.99]** [1.74]* [0.81] [1.99]** [1.74]* [0.81] [1.99]** [1.74]* [0.81]
IndustryOutput 2.9400 3.5000 -1.4300 -2.9400 -9.3000 -1.7100 3.3700 -0.0659 -14.200
[1.02] [2.55]** [4.29]*** [0.08] [2.61]*** [4.92]*** [1.45] [0.05] [4.31]***
FRAG 0.0297 0.0052 -0.0725 0.0078 -0.0353 -0.1332 -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0065
[1.71]* [0.56] [3.13]*** [0.47] [2.38]** [4.94]*** [0.82] [1.58] [4.49]***
Constant 3.2035 3.2872 5.0544 3.1952 5.4093 0.9158 2.5011 3.7605 7.3130
[2.88]*** [3.91]*** [4.91]*** [2.87]*** [7.19]*** [0.61] [2.24]** [4.14]*** [5.59]***
Observations 1185 5392 729 1185 5392 729 1185 5392 729
Number of individuals 378 1742 312 378 1742 312 378 1742 312
R2 0.53 0.24 0.59 0.53 0.24 0.59 0.53 0.24 0.59
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and interaction terms of industry and
year; default categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012
25Table 5: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression for Fragmentation by ISCED Skill Groups
Narrow Fragmentation Wide Fragmentation Import Penetration Non-OECD
High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Age 0.1040 0.1063 0.0504 0.1041 0.1063 0.0326 0.1000 0.1098 0.0520
[3.98]*** [4.91]*** [1.87]* [3.96]*** [4.93]*** [0.66] [2.93]*** [4.79]*** [1.39]
Age2 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0002
[5.40]*** [12.66]*** [0.92] [5.40]*** [12.66]*** [0.92] [5.40]*** [12.66]*** [0.92]
Married 0.1119 0.0783 -0.0207 0.1119 0.0783 -0.0207 0.1119 0.0783 -0.0207
[3.63]*** [5.61]*** [0.36] [3.63]*** [5.61]*** [0.36] [3.63]*** [5.61]*** [0.36]
Number of Children 0.0413 0.0275 -0.0294 0.0413 0.0275 -0.0294 0.0413 0.0275 -0.0294
[3.40]*** [4.17]*** [1.20] [3.40]*** [4.17]*** [1.20] [3.40]*** [4.17]*** [1.20]
Firm size: < 20 -0.1877 -0.0661 -0.1292 -0.1877 -0.0661 -0.1292 -0.1877 -0.0661 -0.1292
[3.47]*** [3.33]*** [1.68]* [3.47]*** [3.33]*** [1.68]* [3.47]*** [3.33]*** [1.68]*
Firm size: < 200 -0.0154 -0.0221 -0.0435 -0.0154 -0.0221 -0.0435 -0.0154 -0.0221 -0.0435
[0.45] [1.39] [0.60] [0.45] [1.39] [0.60] [0.45] [1.39] [0.60]
Firm size: < 2000 -0.0264 -0.0004 0.0368 -0.0264 -0.0004 0.0368 -0.0264 -0.0004 0.0368
[1.02] [0.03] [0.66] [1.02] [0.03] [0.66] [1.02] [0.03] [0.66]
Firm:Public Owner -0.1887 0.0629 -0.0904 -0.1887 0.0629 -0.0904 -0.1887 0.0629 -0.0904
[2.40]** [1.46] [0.66] [2.40]** [1.46] [0.66] [2.40]** [1.46] [0.66]
ln(Actual work hours) 0.2232 0.3401 0.2775 0.2232 0.3401 0.2775 0.2232 0.3401 0.2775
[3.04]*** [10.41]*** [2.47]** [3.04]*** [10.41]*** [2.47]** [3.04]*** [10.41]*** [2.47]**
Tenure 0.0017 0.0026 -0.0078 0.0017 0.0026 -0.0078 0.0017 0.0026 -0.0078
[0.65] [2.89]*** [1.64] [0.65] [2.89]*** [1.64] [0.65] [2.89]*** [1.64]
Tenure not known -0.7559 -0.2005 -0.2388 -0.7559 -0.2005 -0.2388 -0.7559 -0.2005 -0.2388
[3.63]*** [1.82]* [1.33] [3.63]*** [1.82]* [1.33] [3.63]*** [1.82]* [1.33]
Occ:Managers/Legisl. 0.3205 0.0747 -0.1059 0.3205 0.0747 -0.1059 0.3205 0.0747 -0.1059
[2.36]** [2.53]** [0.43] [2.36]** [2.53]** [0.43] [2.36]** [2.53]** [0.43]
Occ:Scientists 0.2897 0.0156 0.4205 0.2897 0.0156 0.4205 0.2897 0.0156 0.4205
[2.17]** [0.47] [2.19]** [2.17]** [0.47] [2.19]** [2.17]** [0.47] [2.19]**
Occ:Technicians 0.2656 0.0025 0.1818 0.2656 0.0025 0.1818 0.2656 0.0025 0.1818
[1.98]** [0.10] [0.71] [1.98]** [0.10] [0.71] [1.98]** [0.10] [0.71]
Occ:Clerks 0.2495 -0.0309 0.3008 0.2495 -0.0309 0.3008 0.2495 -0.0309 0.3008
[1.78]* [1.08] [1.96]* [1.78]* [1.08] [1.96]* [1.78]* [1.08] [1.96]*
Occ:Craft 0.2589 0.0040 0.0202 0.2589 0.0040 0.0202 0.2589 0.0040 0.0202
[1.71]* [0.17] [0.24] [1.71]* [0.17] [0.24] [1.71]* [0.17] [0.24]
Occ:Operators/Assembl. 0.2185 0.0430 0.0568 0.2185 0.0430 0.0568 0.2185 0.0430 0.0568
[2.00]** [1.80]* [0.83] [2.00]** [1.80]* [0.83] [2.00]** [1.80]* [0.83]
IndustryOutput -1.2800 -3.8100 -1.4500 -1.2900 -3.8500 -1.4800 2.0100 0.0613 -4.4300
[0.53] [1.87]* [4.85]*** [0.51] [0.27] [4.76]*** [0.46] [0.05] [1.16]
FRAG -0.0004 -0.0454 -0.0520 -0.0004 -0.0116 -0.0371 -0.0022 -0.0006 -0.0006
[0.06] [2.19]** [2.46]** [0.06] [1.11] [1.63] [0.77] [1.11] [0.43]
Constant 4.7953 4.6791 6.8902 4.7947 4.2450 7.4356 4.6294 3.9812 5.4580
[5.48]*** [6.73]*** [7.88]*** [5.48]*** [5.12]*** [5.21]*** [4.09]*** [4.48]*** [4.38]***
Observations 1151 5325 755 1151 5325 755 1151 5325 755
Number of individuals 356 1692 358 356 1692 358 356 1692 358
R2 0.52 0.22 0.50 0.52 0.22 0.50 0.52 0.22 0.50
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and interaction terms of industry and
year; default categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012
26Table 6: Fixed Eﬀects Log Wage Regression by Required Skill
Narrow Fragmentation Wide Fragmentation Import Penetr. Non-OECD
High Low High Low High Low
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Age 0.1472 0.0814 0.1024 0.0810 0.1707 0.0847
[7.47]*** [4.17]*** [3.85]*** [4.18]*** [7.15]*** [4.12]***
Age2 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0005 -0.0010 -0.0005
[6.55]*** [9.57]*** [6.55]*** [9.57]*** [6.55]*** [9.57]***
Married 0.0942 0.0503 0.0942 0.0503 0.0942 0.0503
[3.16]*** [4.18]*** [3.16]*** [4.18]*** [3.16]*** [4.18]***
Number of Children 0.0323 0.0284 0.0323 0.0284 0.0323 0.0284
[2.81]*** [4.98]*** [2.81]*** [4.98]*** [2.81]*** [4.98]***
Firm size: < 20 -0.0995 -0.0973 -0.0995 -0.0973 -0.0995 -0.0973
[1.77]* [5.71]*** [1.77]* [5.71]*** [1.77]* [5.71]***
Firm size: < 200 0.0146 -0.0417 0.0146 -0.0417 0.0146 -0.0417
[0.44] [3.01]*** [0.44] [3.01]*** [0.44] [3.01]***
Firm size: < 2000 -0.0196 -0.0072 -0.0196 -0.0072 -0.0196 -0.0072
[0.72] [0.69] [0.72] [0.69] [0.72] [0.69]
Firm:Public Owner -0.1493 -0.0142 -0.1493 -0.0142 -0.1493 -0.0142
[1.98]** [0.37] [1.98]** [0.37] [1.98]** [0.37]
ln(Actual work hours) 0.1684 0.3273 0.1684 0.3273 0.1684 0.3273
[2.35]** [11.64]*** [2.35]** [11.64]*** [2.35]** [11.64]***
Tenure 0.0011 0.0047 0.0011 0.0047 0.0011 0.0047
[0.52] [5.98]*** [0.52] [5.98]*** [0.52] [5.98]***
Tenure not known -0.4958 -0.0015 -0.4958 -0.0015 -0.4958 -0.0015
[3.48]*** [0.02] [3.48]*** [0.02] [3.48]*** [0.02]
Occ:Managers/Legisl. 0.7295 0.1080 0.7295 0.1080 0.7295 0.1080
[4.10]*** [4.41]*** [4.10]*** [4.41]*** [4.10]*** [4.41]***
Occ:Scientists 0.7082 0.0882 0.7082 0.0882 0.7082 0.0882
[4.05]*** [2.71]*** [4.05]*** [2.71]*** [4.05]*** [2.71]***
Occ:Technicians 0.7180 0.0380 0.7180 0.0380 0.7180 0.0380
[4.04]*** [1.76]* [4.04]*** [1.76]* [4.04]*** [1.76]*
Occ:Clerks 0.6274 0.0253 0.6274 0.0253 0.6274 0.0253
[3.35]*** [1.05] [3.35]*** [1.05] [3.35]*** [1.05]
Occ:Craft 0.8394 0.0341 0.8394 0.0341 0.8394 0.0341
[4.45]*** [1.76]* [4.45]*** [1.76]* [4.45]*** [1.76]*
Occ:Operators/Assembl. 1.1206 0.0693 1.1206 0.0693 1.1206 0.0693
[4.05]*** [3.62]*** [4.05]*** [3.62]*** [4.05]*** [3.62]***
IndustryOutput 1.2300 -3.2300 10.5000 0.0390 4.7500 0.5230
[0.49] [1.05] [1.43] [0.03] [1.63] [0.46]
FRAG 0.0190 -0.0372 0.0088 -0.0126 0.0002 -0.0006
[1.78]* [2.00]** [0.32] [1.31] [0.44] [1.31]
Constant 2.7655 4.7902 3.8738 4.3561 1.5710 4.1341
[3.73]*** [6.68]*** [4.81]*** [5.92]*** [1.65]* [5.27]***
Observations 1146 5966 1146 5966 1146 5966
Number of individuals 373 2012 373 2012 373 2012
R2 0.54 0.2 0.54 0.2 0.54 0.2
t-statistics in parentheses ¤ signiﬁcant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
not reported: full set of federal state dummies, year dummies, industry dummies and interaction terms of industry and
year; default categories: Firm size:> 2000; Occ:Elementary; IndustryOutput ¤ 1012
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